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Climate change challenges how policy agents imagine and manage risks in space and time. 
The impacts are dynamic, uncertain and contested. We use riskscapes as a lens to ana-
lyse how New Zealand has perceived and mediated natural hazard and climate risks over 
time. We identify five different national riskscapes using a historical timeline, which have 
changed as global risks cascade into national and sub-national governance. We find that 
while there has been a major effort to reflect the dynamic and systemic language of risk 
theory in national policy, a significant challenge remains to develop appropriate govern-
ance and implementation strategies and to shift from long-held ways of doing and knowing.
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Introduction
Climate change is challenging how policy 
agents imagine and seek to govern risks in 
space and time. While there is high scientific 
certainty that the effects of climate change will 
compound existing natural hazard risks, there 
is less certainty about the timing and extent of 
those changes. Not only are many effects dy-
namic and ambiguous, but future risk exposure 
will depend on the political context, such as 
how fast the world reduces its greenhouse gas 
emissions, the choices made regarding the man-
agement and use of land and resources, capital 
investment flows and the cascading effects of 
climate events globally and responses to them 
(IPCC, 2019; World Economic Forum, 2020). 
As the physical effects of climate change have 
been observed and future trajectories become 
clearer, new areas for the attention of the social 
sciences are revealed. For example, the need 
to better understand how climate impacts and 
risks cascade across interconnected economic, 
social, cultural and environmental domains 
(Adger et  al., 2005; Lawrence et  al., 2018), or 
how to integrate climatic change with other 
public policy issues, such as urbanisation or so-
cial justice (Carter et al., 2015; Lawrence, 2016; 
O’Hare and White, 2017; Serrao-Neumann 
et  al., 2017). The complex links between nat-
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considering the globally complex politics at the 
heart of climate change. Even if the science is 
accepted, significant value-laden questions re-
main as to how and when risks should be miti-
gated or who should bear the costs.
As such, the dynamic and uncertain nature 
of climate change presents fundamental chal-
lenges for national and sub-national govern-
ance. For instance, the extent to which our 
politics, election cycles and decision-making 
practices are able to address long-term, un-
certain issues such as climate change (Boston, 
2017; White and Haughton, 2017). Beyond pol-
itics, other institutions have also come under 
the spotlight, most notably land use planning. 
A  dominant international narrative for plan-
ning systems to speed up development, re-
duce regulatory ‘red-tape’ and become more 
‘market-enabling’ (for example HM Treasury, 
2015; New Zealand Productivity Commission, 
2017) has emerged at the same time as planners 
need to tackle the complex and contested issue 
of climate change (Davoudi et al., 2009). A key 
challenge for national and sub-national govern-
ance is to reconcile the long-standing political 
desire to provide an objective, settled state of 
the world—one that allows various actors and 
agencies to invest capital and make quick deci-
sions in a stable regulatory environment—with 
the real-world realities of a changing world that 
demands new ways of knowing and managing 
risk (Lawrence and Saunders, 2017; White, 
2019). This tension has fuelled a rise in policy 
experimentation and the emergence of innova-
tive approaches, such as new tools able to better 
capture and negotiate the spatial and temporal 
challenges of climate change (Haasnoot et al., 
2013; Marchau et  al., 2019; McFadgen and 
Huitema, 2017).
The concept of riskscapes offers similar po-
tential for new insights by redirecting theor-
etical understandings of risk to highlight ‘how 
different actors and social groups develop their 
particular visions of risk and translate these 
into spatial settings’ (Müller-Mahn, 2013, xviii). 
It aims to provide a common framework for 
multiple risks, scales and interactions to be 
considered alongside the varied ways risks are 
imagined, constructed and mediated in an on-
going manner. The spatial focus seeks to merge 
formal institutional understandings of risk and 
territory with more imagined, subjective indi-
vidual dimensions, both of which selectively 
render risks as real (see Müller-Mahn and 
Everts, 2013). These aspects are also connected. 
For example, an important means by which 
climate risks are given visibility, order and 
meaning is established at a national and sub-
national level. Governments design the govern-
ance arrangements that influence how risks are 
understood, influence the focus of expert prac-
tices or delineate what counts as knowledge, 
provide direction to the institutional processes 
and practices, and shape regulatory environ-
ments. These arrangements enable risks to be 
manageable, at least in the short-term and shift 
over time depending upon scientific knowledge 
and socio-political priorities.
Exploring this national and coupled sub-
national perspective forms the basis of this 
article: in simple terms, the theory posits that 
governments and individuals construct their 
own ‘riskscape’ that may change over time and 
space. But what can a riskscape perspective 
tell us about the ways a nation has responded 
to changing knowledge of hazard and climate 
risks over time, and how can this collective 
experience help inform riskscape theory and 
practice?
We choose New Zealand as our national 
focus as it is beset with a complex overlay of 
natural hazard risks, has many different types 
of governance arrangements across different 
hazards and has a high-level of devolution 
of powers and functions to the sub-national 
level of governance. New Zealand also has 
low-frequency and high-impact hazards that 
have severe local and national economic con-
sequences, such as earthquakes or tsunamis; 
frequent climate-related hazards like pluvial 
flooding; or long-term and ongoing hazards 
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drought or changes in flood frequency. In prac-
tice, different agencies and actors manage one 
or many of these hazards and the risks they 
pose. There has also been a period of policy ex-
perimentation, with new approaches designed 
and being implemented to shift from reactive 
responses to anticipatory and transformational 
approaches (Barnett et  al., 2014; Boston and 
Lawrence, 2018; Lawrence et al., 2019; Lawrence 
and Haasnoot, 2017; Ramm et al., 2018; Ranger 
et al., 2013).
We initially situate riskscape theory and re-
search within a national climate change con-
text, before drawing from New Zealand’s 
natural hazards history to chart significant eras 
that characterise the riskscape, and link these to 
shifts in thought and practice. This allows us to 
identify and analyse the evolving relationships 
between the scientific understanding of risk 
and its national and sub-national governance. 
In doing so, we can appreciate how the emer-
gence of the multi-hazard, multi-discipline, 
multi-scalar and multi-temporal knowledges 
and approaches that have recently become part 
of international practice on climate change are 
layered over previous riskscape imaginaries 
that still exert an influence in the present.
Revealing the different dimensions 
of riskscapes
The concept of a riskscape is directly rooted 
in Appadurai’s (1996, 33) identification of five 
differing global cultural flows—financescape, 
ethnoscape, technoscape, mediascape and 
ideoscape—as a new analytical framework 
and empirical approach. His use of the suffix 
-scape was designed to highlight the ‘fluid, ir-
regular shapes of these landscapes… [which] 
are not objectively given relations that look 
the same from every angle of vision but, rather, 
that they are deeply perspectival constructs, 
inflected by the historical, linguistic and pol-
itical situatedness of different sorts of actors’. 
This initial work stimulated a flurry of other 
‘-scapes’ research, including the ‘riskscape’ of 
Müller-Mahn and Everts (2013). Riskscape no-
tions also have connections to two other bodies 
of literature. First, ideas concerning the spa-
tiality of life, most notably those by Lefebvre 
(1991) and Soja (1996). These perspectives 
sought to shift away from space as concrete, 
territorial or material, or as individual mental 
spaces, representations or philosophical per-
spectives, to instead be constructed, conceived 
and experienced through various social rela-
tions, interactions and practices. From a risk 
perspective, there is also a clear connection to 
an established body of work emphasising the 
social and cultural construction of risk and how 
it is experienced in very different ways among 
diverse populations (for example Beck, 1992; 
Blaikie et  al., 1994; Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982; Giddens, 1990).
Literature on ‘-scapes’ therefore may be 
understood as similarly able to hold poten-
tial for providing new perspectives across nu-
merous aspects of risk research and practice; 
whether related to imaginaries and reality, 
constructivist and positivist, relational or con-
tained, or formal regulatory mechanisms and 
lived experiences. The section now identifies 
and analyses the key frames and ideas that 
scholars engaging with the theory and applica-
tion of riskscapes have tended to use in order to 
provide a foundation for understanding chan-
ging national perspectives. While there is no 
one single accepted definition or approach, the 
literature reveals four themes that we highlight 
to inform the discussion.
Risks are connected in space and time
The first common theme associated with 
riskscapes as a distinct concept is connected-
ness and mobility. Müller-Mahn and Everts 
(2013) use the example of the 2011 Fukishima 
disaster in Japan to highlight how the event 
had both immediate local effects and delayed 
global ones. For example, it increased the per-
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design of nuclear power plants and nuclear 
power, which eventually stimulated changes 
in the energy policies of other countries, thus 
having global reach. Policy makers in other 
nations saw nuclear power as ‘riskier’, despite 
those places suffering no effects and being geo-
graphically disconnected. This case shows the 
value of the ‘-scapes’ perspective, which brings 
to prominence the fluidity of global risks and 
how they can become mobile and embedded 
in other national territories. It also allows us to 
unpack spatio-temporal aspects more deeply. 
For instance, inaction or the time-lag to action 
may depend upon the ability of national insti-
tutions that have a mandated responsibility to 
consider risks, or to objectively identify, assess 
and respond to these new constructivist percep-
tions of riskscape (Fuchs and Keiler, 2013).
By emphasising that risks are not bounded 
spatially or temporally the concept maps well 
onto climate change issues where an acknow-
ledged global problem influences a multiplicity 
of national policy goals, each of which have 
regard to their own localised effects and are 
applied in different ways over different scales 
times. Significantly, however—as can be seen 
in the example of nuclear energy—high-profile 
flooding, bushfires or other climate-related im-
pacts in one country can create the anticipation 
of possible impacts elsewhere (Beck, 2009) and 
so potentially stimulate national policy changes 
in new and unpredictable ways.
Risks are perceived and experienced 
differently
The second theme flows from the first, focusing 
on the divergent ways that risk becomes vis-
ible and understood in places. It emphasises 
that people make sense of the world differently. 
Risks are mediated in and through everyday 
practice and for some, the anticipation of risks 
can be as influential as real events. Research 
here explores issues of risk perception, the vari-
able feelings of safety and has a spatial aspect 
that links risk to a specific place and time (for 
example Gee and Skovdal, 2017). Riskscape 
research has, for example, highlighted the con-
struction of new riskscapes, or the fixing of dif-
ferent risks to a particular place, as can be seen 
from the ‘war on terrorism’ which, it is argued, 
is directed at ‘ungoverned territories’ to legit-
imise military action (Schetter, 2013). A further 
strand has engaged with issues of terminology 
and meaning and the ways that language relates 
to specific risk frameworks or the privileging 
of particular interventions (Weichhart and 
Höferl, 2013). So for climate change, while gov-
ernments seek to make risk visible and give 
it meaning within a particular place through 
scientific reports, technical practices or policy 
documents, individuals or communities will in-
evitably interpret those signposts and expert 
cues differently, such as through their own per-
ceptions of safety or via existing social groups. 
Equally, nations will perceive, experience and 
respond to global risks like climate change in 
different ways.
Risks are interconnected across systems
Another strong motif in the literature focuses 
on the multiple and interconnected nature of 
risks that compound and cascade across domains 
(Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018). For example, a 
recurring strand of riskscape research seeks to 
combine data from the social and natural worlds, 
such as between air pollution models and census 
data, as a means to draw attention to the tensions 
between environmental risks and social justice 
(for example Jenerette et al., 2011; Konisky and 
Reenock, 2018; Morello-Frosch et  al., 2001). 
This approach has been used to emphasise the 
intertwining, cascading and parallel nature of so-
cial and natural riskscapes and also how these are 
related to power and agency (Bonati, 2014), for 
example by linking environmental stressors and 
gender (Mair et  al., 2011). Issues connected to 
combining these different knowledges has also 
received scholarly attention, such as research 
discussing the spatial fit of natural hazards and 
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governance processes and arrangements (Renn 
and Klinke, 2013), including the difficulties in 
creating new ‘administrative spaces’ that link sys-
tems (Pohl et al., 2013).
Risks are contingent, emergent and 
uncertain
A final conceptual theme highlights how 
riskscapes are dynamic and that despite efforts 
to provide order, such as by expert practices, eco-
nomic analyses, or hazard maps, there will always 
be a level of unpredictability and ambiguity that 
resists this neat managerial control. Research 
here acknowledges how riskscape perspectives 
lead to new imaginaries or emphasise the inev-
itability of emergent effects. This literature holds 
synergies with relational perspectives that recog-
nise complexity and the subjective way material, 
technical and discursive elements come together 
at particular points in time and space, disperse 
and potentially take on new forms in the future 
(Blok, 2016; Neisser, 2014). A further stream ac-
knowledges the links to decision making, such 
as how uncertainty can spread like a contagion 
between technical and political worlds (Hanna 
et al., 2020), the layers of potential in the ways 
intellectual traditions of natural and human sci-
ences interpret riskscapes (Zahnen, 2013), or 
how administrative traditions influence risk man-
agement outcomes (Van Buuren et  al., 2018). 
These all tend to highlight the importance of 
understanding not just what is at risk, but how 
risks are perceived and addressed.
The varied interpretation and use of theory in 
the literature, from the relatively theoretical to the 
very applied and from the governance of risk to 
individual experiences, in part reflects the emer-
gent nature of riskscape as a concept to different 
disciplines and their methodological traditions.
The changing national riskscape of 
New Zealand
The Introduction developed the notion that just 
as individuals construct their own ‘riskscape’ 
that may change over time and space, gov-
ernments also do. We now turn to exploring 
the idea of a ‘national riskscape’, with a view 
to understanding interactions with global and 
sub-national perspectives and how percep-
tions of risk influence policy frameworks. More 
broadly, we also provide insights into the po-
tential utility of the notion for theory and prac-
tice. In this context, we draw from the review 
of literature (for example Müller-Mahn, 2013, 
xviii) to define ‘national riskscapes’ as repre-
senting how natural hazard and climate risks 
have been imagined and managed within na-
tional policy and devolved to sub-national in-
stitutions over time. Considering the ‘riskscape’ 
concept within a distinct national context 
initially requires reflection on the changing 
practices and discourses that have shaped the 
present and which may continue to exert in-
fluence. We therefore use a historical narrative 
to explore how a national government has re-
sponded to changing knowledge of environ-
mental and climatic risks over time to help 
inform the relationship between contemporary 
riskscape theory and practice. First, we provide 
a timeline of key policy and legislative devel-
opments and the ways these led to changes in 
formal risk management policy and practices at 
national and sub-national levels, followed by a 
narrative account that also takes into consider-
ation international shifts in risk discourses, sci-
ence and governance.
The changing policy and 
legislative context
A primary means by which national riskscapes 
can be created and perceived is via the formal 
institutions and powers of the state. While an 
aspect of natural hazard and climate change 
research focuses on legislation, policy and 
regulation, a riskscape perspective pushes us 
to consider wider issues. For example, how 
does the national scale accept or integrate 
international trends in best practice, what is 
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between the state and other parties, or to what 
extent are risks managed by particular discip-
lines in particular siloes?
Beyond more functional organisational, ad-
ministrative or management aspects, these na-
tional instruments also provide an evolving 
context of expert cues that inevitably influ-
ence the riskscape perceptions and practices 
of others. For instance, they serve to selectively 
render certain risks as more visible or urgent 
for sub-national agencies. As such, they possess 
less tangible powers by providing an authori-
tative set of signals that comprise an ‘official’ 
account of fundamental issues, such as what 
are the risks, how urgent are they and which 
places are deemed risky (Haughton and White, 
2017)? In this regard, there is a flourishing 
scholarly literature on the political economy or 
governmentality of official efforts to promote 
risk management and resilience, in particular 
how it can influence the riskscape of others by 
normalising risks or by redistributing respon-
sibility away from the state towards individual 
adaptation (Evans and Reid, 2013; Joseph, 
2013).
Table  1 provides a concise overview of the 
riskscape timeline, illustrating broad policy 
shifts and trends that have emerged since the 
New Zealand government began to take a role 
in hazard management. By taking a broad over-
view of the developing timeline, we can begin 
to build up a picture of the evolving perception 
of a riskscape within a national territory, such 
as the gradual transition from natural hazards 
to also acknowledging climate change and its 
impact on the riskscape. The table thus helps 
demonstrate how the governance of risks and 
focus of policy attention have become more 
connected in space and over time. In common 
with other countries, we can further appre-
ciate how a national riskscape has gradually 
changed from being sub-national, mainly the 
remit of engineers and mainly concerned with 
soil erosion and floods. It highlights when land-
use planning emerged as a risk management 
mechanism and the subsequent shift from pro-
tective to preventative to precautionary meas-
ures. More recently, we see the influence of the 
international tier through the introduction of 
climate change into the national riskscape and 
how thinking about issues such as uncertainty 
and better integration has begun to influence 
the policy environment.
This historical perspective also allows wider 
insights into the pace of change and inter-scalar 
connections, such as how new global institu-
tions, like the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and UNFCCC, pro-
vide a means to cascade global science into 
national contexts and periodically unsettle ex-
isting riskscapes. We can further observe how 
changes have gathered pace as the increased 
exchange of international data and analyses 
create a faster moving policy environment for 
both national and sub-national agencies.
Taking a broader perspective, we can appre-
ciate the potential utility of a theory that re-
veals the dynamic and relational understanding 
of contemporary risk, which cascades both 
upwards and downwards at various speeds. In 
many ways, its intellectual emergence reflects 
the contingent and subjective nature of current 
international risk thinking and practice.
The changing national riskscapes and 
narratives of risk
We have categorised the national and sub-
national riskscape of New Zealand into five 
distinct Eras, each of which give an insight into 
the changing nature of how natural hazard and 
climate risks are given meaning and the ways 
that historic legacies can still exert an influence 
in the current period.
Era one: experiential and territorial 
risks (up to early 20th century)
New Zealand started its journey towards the con-
temporary riskscape with fire and land clearance 
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and economic development. Geological risks, 
such as experienced in the eruption of Mount 
Tarawera in 1886 and the Hawkes Bay earth-
quake in 1931, and the significant erosion of soil 
from landscape cleared of its protective forests, 
endure to the present day. The most frequent 
natural hazard, however, is flooding (Royal 
Society of New Zealand, 2016). Being located 
between the Southern Ocean and warmer trop-
ical oceans, storms and cyclones have been a 
long-standing hazard, and with significant or-
ography to generate rainfall, there is a legacy of 
widespread flooding and erosion, from the Great 
Floods of 1868 and 1878 to the present day. Early 
migrants settled around waterways and at the 
coast and the intensity of the precipitation and 
rapid rise of flood water presented a riskscape 
that was alien to European settlers, with drown-
ings so frequent that it became known as the 
‘New Zealand death’ (Te Ara, 2019). This per-
ception stands in contrast with the experiential 
knowledge of indigenous Māori, which exhib-
ited a healthy respect for risk in some loca-
tions. For example, historically Māori had not 
settled in great numbers in the Christchurch re-
gion (subject to earthquakes in 2011), as there 
were oral histories that it was risky land prone 
to liquefaction (White and Haughton, 2017). 
Furthermore, many Māori place-names have 
long designated specific territory as risky, such as 
Mangakino (dangerous stream) or Whangateau 
(channel with strong current) (King and Goff, 
2006). The lack of relative state protection at this 
time meant that the riskscape was localised, ex-
periential and characterised by citizens adapting, 
whether anticipatory or not.
Era two: protect, control and tame 
unruly landscapes (early 20th century 
until late 1970s)
The establishment of the New Zealand 
Parliament in 1854 and the Ministry of Works 
and Development in 1876 provided the origins 
of the formal, official institutional riskscape 
we have today. This heralded the resources of 
the state being used for more intensive clear-
ance, planned settlement of new areas and 
the heroic engineering approaches designed 
to protect settlements and control nature. 
The first policy response of note was the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 and 
the building of large flood control schemes, 
using flood and drainage control structures on 
the major rivers and the draining of swamps to 
protect farms and towns. The Act set respon-
sibility for preventing flood damage to state 
and sub-national institutions and gave them 
powers, such as the ability for local rating 
to be adjusted to capture economic bene-
fits. Following a series of major earthquakes 
in 1929 in Murchison, 1931 in Hawke’s Bay, 
1934 in Pahiatua and 1942 in Wairarapa, the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission 
(now the Earthquake Commission) was set 
up in 1945. This was designed to operate as 
a state insurance body of last resort, col-
lecting levies and paying out claims to sup-
port people and property after the risk was 
realised. The Water and Soil Conservation 
Act (1967) was added to the statutory tools 
to ‘control’ erosion and the flow and flooding 
from rivers and lakes. The governance ar-
rangements were top-down and hierarchal, 
but forward thinking in developing a cadre 
of engineers and soil conservators supported 
by a powerful public works organisation with 
ample government funds to support local con-
tributions for sub-national implementation. 
The riskscape signposts in this Era have their 
fingerprints in colonisation and ‘river man-
agement’ worldviews connected to taming 
‘unruly landscapes’ via technical knowledge 
and physical protection. The Era ended with 
the passing of the Town and Country Planning 
Act in 1977, which set the platform for the 
start of statutory planning controls. Much risk 
management literature discusses this period 
as creating a false sense of security among 
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will be protected (for example Burby, 2006; 
Parker, 1995).
Era three: from hazardscape to 
riskscape (1980s–1990s)
The shift from Era two to three gained pace and 
was characterised by a growing recognition of 
the interactions between social and natural sys-
tems, the emergence of a multi-disciplinary ap-
proach and the expansion of riskscape into new 
areas of the state and civil society. The Town 
and Country Planning Act (1977) strength-
ened the visibility and understanding of the 
Hazardscape, addressing the avoidance or re-
duction of danger, damage or nuisance, and 
specifically naming multiple hazards, including 
earthquakes, geothermal and volcanic activity, 
flooding, erosion, landslip, subsidence, silting 
and wind. From this time, there was a focus on 
using science to identify land exposed to haz-
ards in order to restrict future development. 
The 1980s saw a shift in focus from structural 
measures towards non-structural measures and 
from protection towards management. For in-
stance, integrated catchment management 
strategies were developed for flood risk man-
agement, which marks one of the first official 
signals of a transition in language from ‘haz-
ards’ to ‘risk’. A raft of rapid institutional and 
legislative reforms between 1988 and 1992, in 
particular the Local Government Act (1988), 
Resource Management Act (1991), Building 
Act (1991) and a 1992 amendment of the 
Local Government Official Information and 
Meetings Act reflected wider societal changes 
about the relationship between the state and 
civil society that has had a lasting influence 
on sub-national responsibilities and public 
riskscape perceptions. From this point, individ-
uals were gradually given more information on 
natural hazards, such as that provided to poten-
tial property purchasers and rights to be con-
sulted in decision making. These developments 
help form much of the basis of the current 
riskscape signals between the state and citizens. 
For example, there is a sub-national responsi-
bility to make risk visible for citizens via maps. 
At the same time, the power of the state to im-
plement significant structural programmes was 
subject to increasing citizen input.
Era four: from riskscape to riskscapes 
(1990s–2010s)
From the late 1980s onwards, the global 
riskscape was fundamentally altered by the 
rise of climate change and the formation of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 
1988. Nationally, the response was swift, with the 
Royal Society of New Zealand (1990) releasing 
the first official report on the science. Despite 
their seemingly strong connections, during the 
start of this period the natural hazard and cli-
mate change discourses largely proceeded sep-
arately. There was a continued dominance of 
institutional political and funding responses 
based around the one-off hazard events that 
were evident in previous Eras, without much 
evidence of preparation for future changes. As 
can be seen in Table 1, the Era also witnessed 
a number of policy initiatives designed to shift 
away from this historic, siloed legacy and better 
recognise the plurality of risks. The produc-
tion of data and evidence became increasingly 
more sophisticated, particularly with regard to 
modelling exposure and loss under different 
scenarios. For example, the ‘Riskscape’ model-
ling tool (no relation to the theory) adopted a 
multi-hazard approach and sought to create a 
consistent probabilistic approach to integrate 
different risks (King and Bell, 2005). Despite 
these developments, the Era was character-
ised by hazards dealt with in a siloed fashion 
and competing with each other for policy at-
tention. The international shift towards multi-
hazard and multi-scalar assessment was yet to 
cascade into the national level in a substantive 
way. Similarly, while the influence of climate 
change and the use of future scenarios began 
to make multi-temporal risks visible, the shift 
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Era One Era Two Era Three Era Four Era Five
Up to early 20th C Early 20th C to 1970s 1980s to 1990s 1990s to 2010s 2010s to ?
Experienal and 
Territorial Risks
Protect and control 
Landscapes
From Hazardscape to 
Riskscape
From Riskscape to 
Riskscapes
Contested and Polical 
Riskscapes
Naonal and regional 
scale
Global Scale Instuons
Rise of legal, instuonal, 
and regulatory capacity
Rise in public informaon
and cizen engagement




Rise in scienfic capacity. 
New laws, tools, models, 






Decision making under 
uncertainty
Local Scale
Figure 1. The national riskscape eras of New Zealand.
Source: Adapted from Daniels (2009).
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remained un-mandated until 2004 when having 
regard to the ‘effects of climate change’ was 
added to the RMA.
Era five: contested, political riskscapes 
(2010–current period)
Since 2010, there has been a flurry of research 
and policy initiatives aiming to make various 
risks, not least climate change, more visible and 
manageable. For example, ‘precaution’ as an ob-
jective was included in the New Zealand Coastal 
Policy Statement (2010), which strengthened 
the national directions and tools to manage of 
coastal hazards, including sea-level rise. The 
revised Coastal Hazards and Climate Change 
Guidance for Local Government (2017) now 
has managing uncertainty and wide public en-
gagement at its core, ‘significant natural hazard 
risk’ was added to ‘matters of national import-
ance’ in the RMA in 2017, a national climate 
change risk assessment framework was devel-
oped in 2019 and a Climate Change Response 
(Zero Carbon) Amendment Bill (CCRA) was 
passed in late 2019 with almost unanimous pol-
itical support. The Climate Change Response 
Act 2002 set up a Climate Change Commission 
that prepares emissions reduction budgets and 
plans to meet national targets under the Paris 
Agreement and will undertake climate change 
adaptation risk assessments and monitor the 
implementation of the National Adaptation 
Plan to be prepared by the Government. These 
responses can be interpreted as a national gov-
ernment seeking to rapidly change the national 
riskscape by providing new ways to assess, plan 
and manage risks, along with updated infor-
mation, tools and techniques to help decision 
makers at national and sub-national levels 
imagine, cope and plan within complex polit-
ical contexts. Much of the tenor of recent of-
ficial documents or research portrays risks as 
dynamic, multi-temporal, compounding and 
cascading, and explicitly acknowledges the dif-
ficulties that decision-making norms, processes 
and practices have had in making progress on 
climate change adaptation that avoids new 
reduces existing risk (for example Lawrence 
et al., 2018, 2019).
Figure  1 summarises the key characteristics 
and timing of the Eras and emphasises how pre-
vious perceptions and approaches are crucial 
in understanding the composition of the con-
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that the transition between Eras represent a 
gradual and messy layering of conceptual shifts 
that leave riskscape legacies. For example, the 
hard engineering of early approaches con-
tinues to play a vital role for protection, at the 
same time as critiques now firmly acknowledge 
how structures create a false sense of security 
that escalates development in ‘safe’ areas that 
are still exposed to the residual risk. Similarly, 
the long-standing focus on natural hazards as 
part of the national riskscape of New Zealand 
has created a history of institutions, tech-
nical disciplines and ways of working that has 
struggled to adapt to the more uncertain, con-
tested and dynamic risks presented by climate 
change (Lawrence et  al., 2013). The focus on 
providing new guidance and tools at the sub-
national level also recognises the inherent dif-
ficulty that climate change presents for Local 
Government action, particularly as they have 
been given an increasing number of unfunded 
mandates. The language used and signals given 
can also be seen as acknowledgement of the 
contested politics and value-laden choices at 
the heart of many sub-national decisions, for 
example with regard to property rights or the 
economic risks presented by transitioning land 
use or local economies. The recent activity, in 
particular the CCRA and its focus on targets, 
policies and monitoring, holds potential to add 
another riskscape Era, one much more practic-
ally focused on reducing climate emissions and 
adapting to a changing climate.
Discussion: riskscape theory and 
risk management practice
Reflecting on both the theoretical and policy 
discussions allows us to add to the riskscape dis-
course the idea of evolving national riskscapes 
that over time experience both pressures to 
change, particularly in response to periodic 
global agreements, and pressures to stay stable. 
The theme of connectedness of risks in space 
and time has a strong presence. However, the 
historical narrative emphasises how it is not 
just natural hazard and climate risks that are 
more connected, but nations—and by exten-
sion, sub-national tiers too—are becoming in-
creasingly linked with international bodies. The 
rise in prominence of the global scale in nat-
ural hazard and climate risk discourses from 
the 1980s onwards, often through new inter-
national agreements to which countries now 
become signatories and which are periodically 
reviewed (for example ‘the Rio Summit’, ‘the 
Sendai Framework’, or ‘the Paris Agreement’), 
has helped provide the justification for national 
and sub-national legislative and policy re-
sponses. Equally, international climate change 
conferences, decision support tools and best 
guidance assist in rapidly exchange knowledge 
to and between, national and sub-national 
practice.
The research also reveals a series of tensions 
between the theory of riskscapes and prac-
tices of risk management. While the concept 
emphasises how risks are always in a state of 
becoming and are constantly made and re-
made by actors and agencies in a subjective 
manner, national and sub-national plans, policy 
and practices seek to periodically ‘fix’ risks in 
space and time to provide certainty for local 
decision making. This issue is well recognised 
by scholars (for example Boston, 2016, 2017; 
Ruhl, 2012) and is due in part to the nature 
of national politics, where there is a degree of 
pressure to provide sub-national institutional 
and policy stability. This is similar to other 
public policy norms, which are subject to a pro-
cess of periodically opening up for design and 
consultation, then closing down for implemen-
tation (Allmendinger, 2016). The intermittent 
opening of new national risk discourses is also 
subject to wider developments in science, tech-
nology and international governance. For ex-
ample, with regard to climate change, there is 
a noticeable rhythm in activity, as new IPCC 
reports or other international activities seek 
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new agreements that both seek to unsettle the 
current riskscape and support national govern-
ments in developing new policy with new signals 
for sub-national actors and the general public.
While the typical processes of opening up 
and closing down in national policy forma-
tion suggests national riskscapes may not 
be as fluid as other applications of riskscape 
theory, in practice the distinction is not so 
simple, nor stark. Indeed, our research argues 
that the rapid speed of policy change over re-
cent times, combined with a growing political 
consensus and the increasing use of language 
designed to highlight contingency, uncertainty 
and dynamism, points to a national effort 
that is essentially narrowing the gap between 
riskscape theory and practice. For example, in 
New Zealand, the national research funding 
signals have increasingly reinforced practical 
relevance and useable outputs as part of their 
funding criteria, which has fuelled new data 
and tools for sub-national decision makers 
to manage contingency and uncertainty (for 
example Ministry of Business Innovation 
and Employment, 2019). More significantly, 
in previous Eras, the institutions of state and 
national and sub-national resources had fo-
cused on responses to extreme events and post 
hoc policy (Boston and Lawrence, 2018). This 
helped create a policy environment where 
climate change risks were dominated by an 
emissions reduction imperative, rather than 
proactively managing risk impacts or adap-
tation measures. This stance has meant there 
has been a consequent absence of market in-
struments, funding and tools for adaptation at 
sub-national scales. However, cross-party pol-
itical unanimity was finally reached at the end 
of 2019 with the passing of the CCRA, poten-
tially heralding a new Era of climate change 
policy implementation at sub-national levels. 
Whether this recent move brings an end to the 
recent Era of contested riskscapes politics re-
mains to be seen, but it does provide national 
consistency in how political parties send risk 
signals to actors and agencies and render risk 
visible among populations.
Similarly, the strong historic disciplinary 
focus on engineering, law and the ways these 
professions tend to perceive and manage 
riskscapes also helps explain why it has been 
difficult to shift to new ways that seek to re-
cast risks as more complex, contingent and 
connected across systems. In this regard, we 
can appreciate how political risk is not just 
experienced by politicians and political par-
ties, but by institutions and disciplines too. In 
practice, the negative responses from powerful 
lobby groups and the long-standing roles of en-
gineering and law in New Zealand (Lawrence 
et al., 2013) helped shape the role, extent and 
influence of national climate change govern-
ance and, by extension, the perception of the 
national riskscape. It also helps us appreciate 
how attempts to change riskscapes bring polit-
ical risks for both politicians and practitioners.
The strategic perspective of a national 
riskscape also assists in seeing how the direction 
of national research funding can send signals 
to other important governance actors, such as 
the scientific community, which in turn can in-
fluence politicians and practitioners. Although 
multi-disciplinary research is encouraged by 
the national funder—the Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment—to date, there is 
no strategic and coordinated investment dedi-
cated to end-to-end climate change science 
to underpin the visibility and management of 
a national and sub-national climate change 
riskscape. That said, novel tool development 
for decision making under uncertainty has re-
ceived some traction in the flood and coastal 
contexts and is in development in the water 
domain. For instance, dynamic adaptive policy 
pathways planning has been recently embedded 
in national guidance for coastal hazards and cli-
mate change (Lawrence et al., 2018), along with 
innovations for monitoring changing risk using 
signals and triggers (Stephens et al., 2018) and 
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Overall, the recent activity emphasises that 
issues remain in linking what are fast moving 
international and national riskscapes to the 
governance arrangements to support imple-
mentation. This is essentially connected with 
the interface between science and society, such 
as how to improve climate change adaptation, 
how best to move from knowing about climate 
changes and impacts to decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty, or how to monitor 
and sustain progress over scales and time. This 
implementation gap is critical to cementing the 
parallel hazard-climate discourses, as well as 
narrowing the gap between riskscape theory 
and practice.
This discussion also develops our under-
standing of the dimension of riskscape con-
cerned with how risks connect across systems. 
While a strand of riskscape research seeks to 
link the natural and social worlds, such as by 
highlighting how risks disproportionately affect 
certain populations, the relationship between 
the different but intersecting policy domains 
is not yet influencing policy. That said, there is 
now an emerging authoritative national frame-
work, which acknowledges the existence of 
multi-hazard riskscapes and recognises that 
these competing policy interests and issues will 
be a feature at sub-national scales. While its in-
fluence has yet to play out, the contemporary 
national riskscape increasingly acknowledges 
how risk is multi-scalar, temporal and experi-
enced in divergent ways, according to the ex-
posure and vulnerability of people, assets, 
communities and nature, necessitating both 
contingency actions and anticipatory planning 
under conditions of uncertainty (Boston, 2017). 
It discusses coping with the dynamism, uncer-
tainty and ongoing change within riskscapes, 
from one-off high-impact climate events and 
cascading impacts, to slowly emerging issues 
like sea-level rise, to frequent flooding from 
precipitation extremes. Yet, while these types 
of interactions are central to riskscape theory 
and are becoming visible in policy, the research 
emphasises there is still a need for the diverse 
set of governance arrangements able to rec-
ognise and manage these new perspectives 
and aims.
More generally, this discussion shows the 
value of the ‘-scapes’ perspective, which es-
sentially highlights the fluidity of how nations 
respond to global risks and how future threats 
become embedded in national landscapes and 
cascade to sub-national levels. The long-term 
perspective brings to the fore the legacy of the 
previous Eras and how long-standing percep-
tions and practices of risk management con-
tinue to exert influence, even as new riskscapes 
are created and seek to affect the subjective 
knowledge of practitioners and citizens. It high-
lights how notions of a single risk to be man-
aged by a certain discipline, model or technical 
institution, tell us more about the constraints 
of governance rather than the reality of risk. 
The theory also offers a valuable perspective 
on understanding climate change governance, 
where new global riskscapes have emerged 
that have led to a multiplicity of national policy 
goals, each of which will have their own local-
ised effects with agents perceiving and adapting 
to uncertain risks in different ways.
Governments have traditionally been much 
more comfortable in more bounded territorial 
risk spaces than the unbounded imagined 
riskscapes of possible systemic interactions. 
However, we can see how more recent legisla-
tion, policy and expert practices seek to signal, 
if not address, the complex riskscapes that 
multiple parties will have to navigate, from 
global investors or insurers, to local politicians 
and technical staff, to citizens during election 
times. A key message, however, is that the New 
Zealand example shows that despite a signifi-
cant amount of recent activity in policy, funding 
and other areas, significant issues remain in 
linking the new riskscapes imaginaries to the 
governance arrangements that can address 
these. In part, this is due to the power of pre-
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Conclusion
The central questions informing this article 
are twofold: to analyse what a riskscape per-
spective can tell us about the ways a nation has 
responded to changing knowledge of hazards 
and climate risks over time, and to reflect upon 
how this can help inform riskscape theory 
and practice. This article draws attention to 
the ways national riskscapes are constituted 
as a complex assemblage of natural, social, 
economic or political forces that both govern 
land and resources and influence the exposure, 
vulnerability and sensitivity of people and 
places. These aspects highlight the importance 
of understanding the forces of stability when 
seeking change and how markets, institutional 
norms, disciplines or policies at national and 
sub-national levels constitute and stabilise 
riskscapes, at the same time as new informa-
tion and signals seek to influence them to re-
cast these into new forms. While there has been 
an understandable desire for a more singular, 
expert and territorial understanding of risk 
in previous Eras, more recent policy develop-
ments have also made progress in unsettling 
these expectations and highlighting the contin-
gent and emergent nature of climate change. 
We also emphasise how risks intertwine, not 
just between multi-hazards, but the wider pol-
itical challenges presented by climatic action at 
the national level.
This discussion further directs us to how the 
theory can contribute to practice. A core finding 
is that the growing awareness of the connected-
ness of climate risks in space and time needs to 
be matched by governance arrangements that 
can better recognise and cope with the dyna-
mism, uncertainty and ongoing change within 
riskscapes. It is also clear that these need to be 
able to consider differing political preferences 
for making risk visible, the allocation of re-
sponsibility and the speed of transition. While 
changes in national governments always open 
windows of political opportunity, we argue that 
to change national riskscapes we need to go 
beyond policy to include signals and directions 
to science, disciplines, institutions, as well as the 
practical realities of implementation.
The ‘riskscape’ concept can be situated as 
part of a growing social science research agenda 
that seeks to shift the intellectual and govern-
ance focus away from probabilistic, technical 
or managerial risk perspectives to a more so-
cial constructivist stance that recognises multi-
plicity, heterogeneity and interconnectedness. 
Researchers have used the idea as an intellec-
tual device to create various new imaginaries 
that recognise how risk relations and experi-
ences differ, shift and reform over space and 
time. In this regard, it is also clear that the con-
cept itself is still in a state of emergence and 
development, particularly with regard to its 
translation from theory to practice.
Müller-Mahn (2013, 35) discussed the flaws 
in issue-centred riskscapes presented mainly 
through expert practices and which operate on 
a wide understanding of problems. He further 
argued that these understandings struggle to 
take into account the complexity of everyday 
life and the multiplicity of ‘riskscapes’ encoun-
tered at the local level. Our reflections through 
the historical riskscape of a nation seek to add 
to this discourse. In doing so we seek to re-
direct discussion on why substantive national 
action is hard, away from a focus on policy or 
legislation, to a focus on matching policy to 
implementation. Just as the riskscape notion 
allows us to become attuned to the multipli-
city of risks faced at the local level, so too 
does it allow us to identify that climate risk 
has to be mediated through a lens of political, 
professional and institutional risks, and given 
the requisite governance and implementation 
support.
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